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Abstract We present a propositional and a first-order logic for reasoning
about higher-order upper and lower probabilities. We provide sound and com-
plete axiomatizations for the logics and we prove decidability in the proposi-
tional case. Furthermore, we show that the introduced logics generalize some
existing probability logics.
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1 Introduction
In the last few decades, uncertain reasoning has become an active topic of
investigation for researchers in the fields of computer science, artificial intelli-
gence and cognitive science. The frameworks designed for modeling uncertainty
often use probability-based interpretation of knowledge or belief. One partic-
ular line of research concerns the formalization of reasoning about probability
in terms of logic with a well-defined syntax and semantics [6–10,15,20,22–25].
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In order to model some situations of interest, where sharp numerical prob-
abilities appear too simple for modeling uncertainty, various imprecise proba-
bility models are developed [2,5,18,21,28,30,31,33]. Some of those approaches
use sets of probability measures instead of one fixed measure, and the uncer-
tainty is represented by two boundaries, called lower probability and upper
probability [13,17]. Given an arbitrary set P of probability measures, the for-
mer one assigns to an event X the infimum of the probabilities assigned to X
by the measures in P , while the later one returns their supremum.
Those two probability notions were previously formalized in the logic de-
veloped in [11], where lower and upper probability operators are applied to
propositional formulas, and in [26], where a first-order logic is also considered.
In this paper, we use the papers [11,26] as a starting point and generalize
them in a way that we reason not only about lower and upper probabilities
an agent assigns to a certain event, but also about her uncertain belief about
other agent’s imprecise probabilities. Thus, we introduce separate lower and
upper probability operators for different agents, and we allow nesting of the
operators, similarly as it has been done in [7] in the case of simple probabili-
ties.We first present a propositional variant of this logic, which we denote by
ILUPP1, and then we extend it to a first-order logic. We prove that ILUPP
is decidable and we propose sound and strongly complete axiomatizations for
both logics.
Our language contains the upper and lower probability operators Ua≥r and
La≥r, for every agent a and every rational number r from the unit interval
(we also introduce the operators with other types of inequalities, like Ua=r).
Consider the following example: Suppose that an agent a is planning to visit
a city based on the weather reports from several sources, and she decides to
take an action if the probability of rain is at most 110 , according to all reports
she considers. Since she wishes to go together with b, she should be sure with
probability at least 910 that b (who might consult different weather reports) has
the same conclusion about the possibility of rain. In our language, this situation
can be formalized as
Ua≤ 110
Rain ∧ La≥ 910 (U
b
≤ 110
Rain).
We also introduce the notions of lower and upper probability of a (possibly
infinite) set of agents by introducing the operators LG≥s and U
G
≥s. In our ap-
proach we assume that the agents can share their sets of probabilities in order
to obtain a larger set that is available to all the members of the group.
It is worth clarifying the additional expressive power of our first-order logic,
which we denote by ILUPFO, and it’s comparison with [26]. The paper [26] in-
troduces a logic whose syntax allows only Boolean combinations of formulas
in which lower and upper probability operators are applied to first order sen-
tences. On the other hand, here we use the most general approach, allowing
1 The notation is motivated by the logic LUPP from [27], where LUP stands for “lower
and upper probability”, while the second P indicates that the logic is propositional. We add
I to denote iteration of upper and lower operators.
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arbitrary combination of probability operators, so we can express the state-
ment like “according to the agent a, the lower probability of rain in all cities
is at least 13” (L
a
≥ 13
∀xRain(x)), but also “There exists a city in which it will
surely not rain:”
(∃x)Ua=0Rain(x).
The appropriate modal semantics for our logics consists of a specific class
of Kripke models, in which every world is equipped with sets of probability
measures (one set for each agent).
We propose sound and strongly complete axiomatizations of the logics. In-
terestingly, we use the same axiomatizations that we used in [26], and we show
that they are also complete for the richer logics presented here. Of course, the
instances of the axiom schemata are different, because the sets of formulas of
ILUPP and ILUPFO are larger, due to nesting of lower and upper probabil-
ity operators, and due to the presence of more agents. Also, the definition of
the syntactical consequence (proof) ` is different, due to the different inter-
pretation of classical formulas. Since the sets of formulas and the classes of
models are different, the proof techniques are modified. In order to achieve
completeness, we use a Henkin-like construction, following some of our earlier
developed methods [4,22,25,26,29].
In addition, we show how to extend the proposed axiomatizations in order
to properly capture the notions of lower and upper probability of an infinite
set of agents.
The interesting situation that one axiomatic system is sound and complete
for more than one class of models is not an exception. For example, modal
system K is also sound and complete with respect to the class of all irreflexive
models [14].
We also prove that the satisfiability problem for ILUPP logic is decidable.
We combine the method of filtration [14] and a reduction to linear program-
ming. In the first part of the proof, we show that a formula α is satisfiable in
a world w of an ILUPP model if and only if it is satisfiable in a finite model,
i.e., a model with a finite number of worlds, bounded by a number which is
a function of the length of α, and such that the sets of probability measures
are finite in every world of the model. Note that, while in a standard modal
framework this is enough to prove decidability, since for every natural number
k there are only finitely many modal models with k worlds, this is not the case
for our logic. Indeed, since our models involve sets of probability measures, for
every finite set of k worlds, there are uncountably many probability measures
defined on them, and uncountably many models with k worlds. However, in
the second part of the proof we use a reduction to linear programming to solve
the probabilistic satisfiability in a finite number of steps.
Finally, we show that the logics proposed in this paper generalize the log-
ics for reasoning about sharp probabilities from [23,24]. Indeed, we use an
additional axiom scheme to restrict the class of our models to the models iso-
morphic to those from[23,24]. We also formally infer all the axioms from [23,
24] using our extended axiomatization.
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The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the set of
formulas of the logic ILUPP and we define the corresponding semantics. Then,
in Section 3 we prove that the satisfiability problem for the logic ILUPP is
decidable. In Section 4 we provide an axiomatic system ILUPP, and we prove
that the axiomatization is strongly complete. The first-order logic ILUPFO is
presented in section 5. In section 6, we show how to extend the presented ax-
iomatic systems in case of infinite number of agents and we discuss decidability
issues. We show that the proposed logics generalize the probability logics from
[23,24] in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 contains some concluding remarks.
2 The logic ILUPP
In this section we introduce the syntax and the semantics of the logic ILUPP.
Let Σ = {a, b, . . . } be a finite, non-empty set of agents. Let S = Q ∩ [0, 1]
and let L = {p, q, r, . . . } be a denumerable set of propositional letters. The
language of the logic ILUPP consists of the elements of set L, propositional
connectives ¬ and ∧, and
– the list of upper probability operators Ua≥s, for every a ∈ Σ and s ∈ S,
– the list of lower probability operators La≥s, for every a ∈ Σ and s ∈ S.
Definition 1 (Formula) The set ForILUPP of formulas is the smallest set
containing all elements of L and that is closed under following formation rules:
if α, β are formulas, then La≥sα, U
a
≥sα, ¬α and α ∧ β are formulas as well.
The formulas from ForILUPP will be denoted by α, β, . . .
Intuitively, Ua≥sα means that according to an agent a, upper probability
that a formula α is true is greater or equal to s and analoguosly La≥sα means
that according to an agent a lower probability that a formula α is true is
greater or equal to s.
Note that we use conjunction and negation as primitive connectives, while
∨, → and ↔ are introduced in the usual way. We also use abbreviations to
introduce other types of inequalities:
– Ua<sα is ¬Ua≥sα, Ua≤sα is La≥1−s¬α, Ua=sα is Ua≤sα∧Ua≥sα, Ua>sα is ¬Ua≤sα,
– La<sα is ¬La≥sα, La≤sα is Ua≥1−s¬α, La=sα is La≤sα∧La≥sα, La>sα is ¬La≤sα.
For example, the expression
p ∧ Ua=0.9Lb=0.3(p ∨ q)
is a formula of our language.
Furthermore, we introduce the additional operators LG≥s and U
G
≥s that can
speak about upper/lower probability of a group of agents G. We assume that
the agents can share their sets of probabilities in order to obtain a larger set
that is available to all the members of the group. Naturally, upper probability
of an event w.r.t. that set will be at least upper probability of an individual
agent; similarly, its lower probability is at most lower probability of a member
of the group. Following that intuition, we introduce the abbreviations:
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– LG≥sα is the formula
∧
a∈G L
a
≥sα,
– UG≥sα is the formula
∨
a∈G U
a
≥sα.
We also introduce the corresponding operators with other types of inequalities,
in the same way as we have done it for individual agents.
This formalization is in tune with the intuition behind the example given
in the introduction, where the agent a is reasoning in a skeptical way: she will
visit a city as the probability of rain is at most 110 , according to all weather
reports she considers. Then, if the agent b shares a new, more negative report
coming from a different source (e.g. probability of rain is 15), a can revise her
decision based on the updated upper probability.
At first glance, the asymmetry between LG≥s and U
G
≥s (conjunction vs dis-
junction) might look counter-intuitive. On the contrary, we believe that using
the same type of connective (e.g. conjunction, which would be in the spirit
of the epistemic operator EG “everyone in the group G knows”) would not
fit the general intuition behind upper and lower probabilities: if increasing
(resp. decreasing) upper probability comes from enlarging (narrowing) the set
of probabilities, then lower probability should decrease (increase).2 Moreover,
we will see that our definition of LG≥s and U
G
≥s implies that the groups seman-
tically behave like individual agents.
In the last section, we discuss the alternative possibility for defining lower
and upper probability of a group.
The semantics of the logic ILUPP is based on the possible-world approach.
Every world is equipped with an evaluation function on propositional letters,
and one generalized probability space for each agent.
Definition 2 (ILUPP-structure) An ILUPP-structure is a tuple 〈W,LUP, υ〉,
where:
– W is a nonempty set of worlds,
– LUP assigns, to every w ∈ W and every a ∈ Σ, a space, such that
LUP (a,w) = 〈W (a,w), H(a,w), P (a,w)〉, where:
– ∅ 6= W (a,w) ⊆W ,
– H(a,w) is an algebra of subsets of W (a,w), i.e. a set of subsets of
W (a,w) such that:
- W (a,w) ∈ H(a,w),
- if A,B ∈ H(a,w), then W (a,w) \A ∈ H(a,w) and A∪B ∈ H(a,w),
– P (a,w) is a set of finitely additive probability measures defined on
H(a,w), i.e. for every µ(a,w) ∈ P (a,w), µ(a,w) : H(a,w) −→ [0, 1]
and the following conditions hold:
• µ(a,w)(W (a,w)) = 1,
• µ(a,w)(A ∪B) = µ(a,w)(A) + µ(a,w)(B), whenever A ∩B = ∅.
2 Also, note that the notions conjunctive and disjunctive are relative in this specific con-
text, since the type of connective is closely related to the type of inequality that an operator
uses. For example, the definition UG≥sα ≡
∨
a∈G U
a
≥sα is equivalent to the “conjunctive’
definition UG≤sα ≡
∧
a∈G U
a
≤sα.
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– υ : W × L −→ {true, false} provides for each world w ∈ W a two-valued
evaluation of the primitive propositions.
Now we define satisfiability of the formulas from ForILUPP in the worlds
of ILUPP-structures. As we mentioned in the introduction, for any set P of
probability measures defined on given algebraH, the lower probability measure
P? and the upper probability measure P
? are defined by
– P?(X) = inf{µ(X) | µ ∈ P} and
– P ?(X) = sup{µ(X) | µ ∈ P},
for every X ∈ H. It is easy to check that
P?(X) = 1− P ?(Xc), (1)
for every X ∈ H. In the context of the definition of an ILUPP-structure, we will
denote P?(a,w)([α]
a
M,w) = inf{µ([α]aM,w) | µ ∈ P (a,w)} and P ?(a,w)([α]aM,w) =
sup{µ([α]aM,w) | µ ∈ P (a,w)}, where [α]aM,w = {u ∈W (a,w) |M,u |= α}.
Definition 3 (Satisfiability relation) For every ILUPP structure M =
〈W,LUP, υ〉 and every w ∈W , the satisfiability relation |= fulfills the following
conditions:
– if p ∈ L, M,w |= p iff υ(w)(p) = true,
– M,w |= ¬α iff it is not the case that M,w |= α,
– M,w |= α ∧ β iff M,w |= α and M,w |= β,
– M,w |= Ua≥sα iff P ?(a,w)([α]aM,w) ≥ s,
– M,w |= La≥sα iff P?(a,w)([α]aM,w) ≥ s.
We will omit M when it’s clear from context. Obviously, the operators indexed
by groups satisfy the conditions:
– M,w |= LG≥sα iff M,w |= La≥sα for all a ∈ G,
– M,w |= UG≥sα iff M,w |= Ua≥sα for some a ∈ G.
Remark 1 Our logic has two types of basic operators for describing lower and
upper probabilities. However, from the semantical point of view, lower prob-
abilities can be inferred from upper probabilities, according to the equation
(1). That fact will impact the presentation of the results in this paper. For
example, in the proofs that use induction on the complexity of a formula to
prove its semantical properties, the case when the formula is of the form La≥sα
is an easy consequence of the case when we consider Ua≥sα (as an illustration,
see the last paragraph of the proof of Theorem 2). Another consequence of the
equation (1) is that the canonical model (Definition 1), used for the proof of
completeness, can be defined using upper probabilities only.
It can be shown that satisfiability of the operators indexed by groups can
be characterized by the set of probability measures that collect all the mea-
sures of individual members of the group. Indeed, if P (G,w) denotes the set⋃
a∈G P (a,w), we can observe that
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– M,w |= UG≥sα iff P ?(G,w)([α]aM,w) ≥ s,
– M,w |= LG≥sα iff P?(G,w)([α]aM,w) ≥ s.
It is clear from these two conditions that the behavior of the operators indexed
by groups is similar to behavior of operators for individual agents. Indeed, they
also represent upper and lower probability of a set of probabilities.
Note that this semantical interpretation of satisfiability does not use the
fact that G is finite, and it will also be applicable in Section 6, where we will
consider infinite groups of agents.
The possible problem with Definition 3 is that it might happen that for
some M , w , a and α the set [α]aM,w doesn’t belong to W (a,w). For that
reason, we will consider only so called measurable structures.
Definition 4 (Measurable structure) The structure M is measurable if
for every a ∈ Σ and every w ∈W , H(a,w) = {[α]w | α ∈ ForILUPP}. The class
of all measurable structures of the logic ILUPP will be denoted by ILUPPMeas.
Next we define satisfiability of an ILUPP-formula.
Definition 5 (Satisfiability of a formula) A formula α ∈ ForILUPP is sat-
isfiable if there is a world w in an ILUPPMeas-model M such that w |= α; α
is valid if it is satisfied in every world in every ILUPPMeas-model M . A set of
formulas T is satisfiable if there is a world w in an ILUPPMeas-model M such
that w |= α for every α ∈ T .
3 Decidability of ILUPP
In this section, we prove our main technical result. Recall the satisfiability
problem: given an ILUPP-formula α, we want to determine if there exists a
world w in an ILUPPMeas-model M such that w |= α. Decidability for ILUPP
will be proved in two steps:
– first, we show that an ILUPP-formula is satisfiable iff it is satisfiable in a
measurable structures with a finite number of worlds,
– second, we show that we can consider only finite measurable structures,
i.e., measurable structure with finite number of worlds and with finite sets
of probability measures in every world and for every agent, and
– third, we reduce the satisfiability problem in those finite models to a de-
cidable linear programming problem.
In the first part of the proof, we will use the method of filtration [14]. Like
the previous papers on the logical formalization of upper and lower probabili-
ties [11,26], we also use the characterization theorem by Anger and Lembcke
[1]. It uses the notion of (n, k)-cover.
Definition 6 ((n, k)-cover) A set A is said to be covered n times by a multi-
set {{A1, . . . , Am}} of sets if every element of A appears in at least n sets from
A1, . . . , Am, i.e., for all x ∈ A, there exists i1, . . . , in in {1, . . . ,m} such that
for all j ≤ n, x ∈ Aij . An (n, k)-cover of (A,W ) is a multiset {{A1, . . . , Am}}
that covers W k times and covers A n+ k times.
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Now we can state the characterization theorem.
Theorem 1 (Anger and Lembcke [1]) Let W be a set, H an algebra of
subsets of W , and f a function f : H −→ [0, 1]. There exists a set P of prob-
ability measures such that f = P ? iff f satisfies the following three properties:
(1) f(∅) = 0,
(2) f(W ) = 1,
(3) for all natural numbers m,n, k and elements A1, . . . , Am in H, if the multi-
set {{A1, . . . , Am}} is an (n, k)-cover of (A,W ), then k+nf(A) ≤
∑m
i=1 f(Ai).
Let SF (α) denote the set of all subformulas of a formula α, i.e.
SF (α) = {β | β is a subformula of α}.
Theorem 2 If a formula α is satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in an ILUPPMeas-
model with at most 2|SF (α)| worlds.
Proof. Suppose that a formula α holds in some world of the model M =
〈W,LUP, υ〉 and let k = |SF (α)|. By ≈, we will denote an equivalence relation
over W 2, such that
w ≈ u if and only if for every β ∈ SF (α), w |= β iff u |= β.
Since there are finitely many subformulas of α, we know that the quotient set
W/≈ = {Cwi | wi ∈W}
is finite, where
Cwi = {u ∈W | u ≈ wi}
is the class of equivalence of wi. More precsely,
|W/≈| ≤ 2k.
Next, from each class of equivalence Cwi , we choose an element wi.
Consider a tuple M = 〈W,LUP, υ〉, where:
– W = {w1, w2, . . . },
– For every a and for every wi LUP (a,wi) = 〈W (a,wi), H(a,wi), P (a,wi)〉
is defined as follows:
- W (a,wi) = {wj ∈W | (∃u ∈ Cwj )u ∈W (a,wi)}
- H(a,wi) = 2
W (a,wi)
- P (a,wi) is any set of finitely additive measures, such that for every
D ∈ H(a,wi), P
?
(a,wi)(D) = P
?(a,wi)(
⋃
wj∈D(Cwj ∩W (a,wi)))
– υ(wi)(p) = υ(wi)(p), for every primitive proposition p ∈ L.
First, we have to prove that P
?
(a,wi) satisfies the conditions (1)−(3) from
Theorem 1, which will guarantee the existence of the sets P (a,wi), for every
agent a and each wi ∈W .
(1) P
?
(a,wi)(∅) = P ?(a,wi)(
⋃
wj∈∅(Cwj ∩W (a,wi))) = P
?(a,wi)(∅) = 0;
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(2) P
?
(a,wi)(W (a,wi)) = P
?(a,wi)(
⋃
wj∈W (a,wi)(Cwj ∩W (a,wi))) =
= P ?(a,wi)(W (a,wi)) = 1;
(3) Let {{D1, . . . , Dm}} be an (n, k)-cover of (D,W (a,wi)). That means:
i) every element from D appears in at least n+ k sets from D1, . . . , Dm;
ii) every element fromW (a,wi) appears in at least k sets fromD1, . . . , Dm.
Therefore,
iii) every element from (
⋃
u∈D(Cu∩W (a,wi)) appears in at least n+k sets
from
⋃
u∈D1(Cu ∩W (a,wi)), . . . ,
⋃
u∈Dm(Cu ∩W (a,wi));
iv) every element from W (a,wi) appears in at least k sets from⋃
u∈D1(Cu ∩W (a,wi)), . . . ,
⋃
u∈Dm(Cu ∩W (a,wi)).
Hence, by definition, we obtain that a multiset
{{
⋃
u∈D1
(Cu ∩W (a,wi)), . . . ,
⋃
u∈Dm
(Cu ∩W (a,wi))}}
is an (n, k)-cover of
(
⋃
u∈D
(Cu ∩W (a,wi)),W (a,wi)).
Hence, using the fact that P ?(a,wi) is an upper probability, from Theo-
rem 1, we have that
k+nP ?(a,wi)(
⋃
u∈D
(Cu∩W (a,wi))) ≤
m∑
j=1
P ?(a,wi)(
⋃
u∈Dj
(Cu∩W (a,wi))),
and therefore
k + nP
?
(a,wi)(D) ≤
m∑
j=1
P
?
(a,wi)(Dj).
Using induction on the complexity of a formula from the set SF (α), we
can prove that for every w ∈W and every β ∈ SF (α),
M,w |= β if and only if M,w |= β.
If a formula is a propositional letter or obtained using Boolean connectives,
the claim is trivial. So, let us consider the case when β = Ua≥sγ:
M,w |= Ua≥sγ iff
P ?(a,w)({u ∈W (a,w) |M,u |= γ}) ≥ s iff
P ?(a,w)(
⋃
M,u|=γ
Cu ∩W (a,w)) ≥ s iff (ind. hyp.)
P
?
(a,w)({u ∈W ?(a,w) |M,u |= γ}) ≥ s iff
M,w |= Ua≥sγ.
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At the end, let β = La≥sγ:
M,w |= La≥sγ iff
P?(a,w)({u ∈W (a,w) |M,u |= γ}) ≥ s iff (equation (1))
1− P ?(a,w)({u ∈W (a,w) |M,u |= ¬γ}) ≥ s iff
1− P ?(a,w)(
⋃
M,u|=¬γ
Cu ∩W (a,w)) ≥ s iff (ind. hyp.)
P
?
(a,w)({u ∈W ?(a,w) |M,u |= ¬γ}) ≤ 1− s iff
M,w |= Ua≤1−s¬γ iff
M,w |= La≥sγ.

In the second part of the proof, we use the following result of Halpern and
Pucella [11].
Theorem 3 ([11]) Let P be a set of probability measures defined on an alge-
bra H over a finite set W . Then there exists a set P ′ of probability measures
such that, for each X ∈ H, P ∗(X) = (P ′)∗(X). Moreover, there is a probability
measure µX ∈ P ′ such that
µX(X) = P
∗(X).
As a direct consequence of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, we obtain the fol-
lowing result.
Lemma 1 If a formula α is satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in an ILUPPMeas-
model with at most 2|SF (α)| worlds and for every agent a ∈ Σ and every
w ∈W , H(a,w) = 2W (a,w) and
|P (a,w)| = |H(a,w)|.
Furthermore, for each X ∈ H(a,w), there exists a µX ∈ P (a,w) such that
µX(a,w)(X) = P
∗(a,w)(X).
This lemma plays an important role in our proof of decidability. In the
proof we will use the following notation: If α is an arbitrary formula, then
SF (α) = {β1, . . . , βk}.
In every w ∈W , exactly one of the formulas of the following form:
±β1 ∧ · · · ∧ ±βk (2)
holds, where ±βi denotes βi or ¬βi. We will call that formula the characteristic
formula for a world w. Also by β ∈ (αj)+ we will denote that β is a conjunct
in αj and by β ∈ (αj)− we will denote that ¬β is a conjunct in αj .
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Theorem 4 Satisfiability problem for ILUPPMeas is decidable.
Proof. Let M = 〈W,LUP, υ〉 be an ILUPPMeas-model and α an arbitrary
formula. If k is the cardinality of the set SF (α), by Lemma 1 we know that
there exists an ILUPPMeas-model M with
1) at most 2k worlds and
2) at most 22
k
probabilistic measures (for any agent and any world) such that
for each measurable set X, there exists a probabilistic measure µX with
µX(a,w)(X) = P
∗(a,w)(X),
such that α holds in some world of the model M iff α holds in some world of
a model M . Let us denote by ILUPPMeas(k) the set of all measurable models
which satisfy the conditions 1) and 2). Clearly, in order to check if α is satis-
fiable, it is sufficient to check if α is satisfied in a model from ILUPPMeas(k).
For every l ≤ 2k, we will consider models with
– l worlds, w1, . . . , wl, and
– for every agent a and every world w, sets of probability measures P (a,w),
such that |P (a,w)| = 2|W (a,w)|, for every W (a,w) ⊆ {w1, . . . wl}.
Recall that in each of these worlds, exactly one characteristic formula holds.
Thus, without loss of generality, in this proof we identify worlds with their
corresponding characteristic formulas. We will denote by αi the characteristic
formula for a world wi.
Note that it is not the case that any formula of the form (2) is a charac-
teristic formula of some world, since it might be propositionally inconsistent.
We can formally check if the formula αi of the form (2) is propositionally
consistent using the following test:
(a) In αi we replace every occurrence of a formula starting with a probabilistic
operator with an atomic proposition (all the occurrences of the same for-
mula are assigned the same atomic proposition). Then we obtain a propo-
sitional formula, α′i. Using any algorithm for propositional satisfiability we
check whether α′i is satisfiable. If α
′
i passes the test, then αi is consistent.
We check if α is satisfied in a model from ILUPPMeas(k) using the following
procedure:
1) The procedure sets:
– The number of worlds l such that 1 ≤ l ≤ 2k (i.e., W = {w1, . . . , wl});
– l formulas α1, . . . , αl (not necessarily different) of the form
±β1 ∧ · · · ∧ ±βk,
where SF (α) = {β1, . . . , βk} such each formula passes the consistency
test (a), and such that α is a conjunct of at least one αi;
– an arbitrary subset of worlds W (a,wi) ⊆ {w1, . . . wl}, for every agent
a and every wi ∈W ;
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2) Using the test described below, the procedure checks if there is a model
M = 〈W,LUP, υ〉 of α from ILUPPMeas(k) with the set of worlds W =
{w1, . . . , wl} and their corresponding characteristic formulas α1, . . . , αl,
and such that LUP contains all W (a,wi)’s
3) If the test succeeds, the formula α is satisfiable, and the procedure termi-
nates, otherwise procedure sets different values at step 1) and repeats the
test.
4) If the test fails for all the possibilities for l, α1, . . . , αl and W (a,wi)’s (for
every a and wi), the formula α is not satisfiable.
Now it remains to describe the test (from step 2) which, for given
– number of worlds l (1 ≤ l ≤ 2k),
– characteristic formulas α1, . . . , αl of l worlds, and
– sets of worlds W (a,wi) ⊆ {w1, . . . wl}
checks if there is a model of α from ILUPPMeas(k), where W = {w1, . . . wl},
with those characteristic formulas of worlds and those W (a,wi)’s in LUP . In
the test we do not determine probability values precisely; we simply check
if there are probability measures such that the probabilistic constraints are
satisfied in corresponding worlds.
The test translates the problem to the problem of satisfiability of a set of
linear equations and inequalities. Since the models from ILUPPMeas(k) have
finite sets of worlds, all the subsets of W (a,wi) will be measurable. Also, note
that every µ(a,wi) ∈ P (a,wi) is of the form µX (recall that µX is such that
µX(a,w)(X) = P
∗(a,w)(X)). The test considers the following set of linear
equations and inequalities:
1) yX,awi,wj ≥ 0, for each µX(a,wi) ∈ P (a,wi) (i.e., for every X ⊆ W (a,wi))
and j = 1, . . . , l;
2)
∑
wj∈W (a,wi)
yX,awi,wj = 1, for every µ(a,wi) ∈ P (a,wi) (i.e., for every
X ⊆W (a,wi));
3)
∑
wj∈X
yX,awi,wj ≥
∑
wj∈X
yY,awi,wj , for every X,Y ⊆W (a,wi);
4)
∑
wj :β∈(αj)+
yX,awi,wj ≥ s, if U
a
≥sβ ∈ αi, X = {wj | β ∈ (αj)+};
5)
∑
wj :β∈(αj)+
yX,awi,wj < s, if ¬U
a
≥sβ ∈ αi, X = {wj | β ∈ (αj)+};
6)
∑
wj :β∈(αj)−
yX,awi,wj ≤ 1− s, if L
a
≥sβ ∈ αi, X = {wj | β ∈ (αj)−};
7)
∑
wj :β∈(αj)−
yX,awi,wj > 1− s, if ¬L
a
≥sβ ∈ αi, X = {wj | β ∈ (αj)−},
where yX,awi,wj represents µX(a,wi)({wj}).
- The first inequality states that all the measures must be nonnegative.
- The second equality assures that the probability of the set of all possible
worlds has to be equal to 1.
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- The third inequality corresponds to the fact that µX(a,w)(X) = P
∗(a,w)(X)
and therefore
µX(a,w)(X) ≥ µ(a,w)(X), for all µ(a,w) ∈ P (a,w).
- For the fourth and fifth inequality, note that if X = {wj | β ∈ (αj)+}∑
wj :β∈(αj)+
µX(a,wi)({wj}) = P ∗(a,wi)([β]awi),
so these inequalities reflect the appropriate constraints.
- In order to understand sixth and seventh inequality, first recall the equality
connecting upper and lower probabilty:
P ∗([¬β]awi) = 1− P∗([β]
a
wi).
Next, note that if X = {wj | β ∈ (αj)−}∑
wj :β∈(αj)−
µX(a,wi)({wj}) = P ∗(a,wi)([¬β]awi).
Consequently, if
P∗([β]
a
wi) ≥ s,
then
P ∗([¬β]awi) ≤ 1− s,
and similarly for the case when P∗([β]
a
wi) < s.
The equations and inequalities 1–7 form a finite system of linear equalities
and inequalities and it is well known that solving this system is decidable. If
this system has a solution, then there exists a probabilistic space in each world
and for every agent. Indeed, it can be defined in the following way:
µX(a,wi)(S) =
∑
wj∈S
yX,awi,wj
for every S ⊆W (a,wi). The opposite also holds: if the system doesn’t have so-
lutions, then the probabilistic spaces (in each world and for every agent) cannot
exist. Indeed, otherwise we could use the probability measures µX(a,wi) to de-
fine the solution of the system in the following way: yX,awi,wj = µX(a,wi)({wj}).
Also note that because of the condition (a) above, we know that a valuation
can be defined. Namely, there are no classical propositional contradictions
in characteristic formulas and therefore there exists a valuation that gives
adequate truth values to the propositional letters that appear in formulas and
for all the other variables we can set arbitrary truth value, e.g. ⊥. Moreover,
in every world w of the model, the characteristic formula of the world holds
in w. Since α is a conjunct of at least one of the corresponding characteristic
formulas, we have that α is satisfiable.
Note that in the previously described method we consider only finitely
many systems of linear equation and inequalities. Therefore, the satisfiability
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problem is decidable. 
Furthermore, α is valid if and only if ¬α is not ILUPPMeas-satisfiable, so
we have also that problem of a validity of a formula is decidable as well.
4 A complete axiomatization of ILUPP
Having settled the decidability issue for the logic ILUPP, we turn to the prob-
lem of developing an axiomatic system for the logic ILUPP. That system will
be denoted by AxILUPP.
We start with the observation that, like any other real-valued probabilis-
tic logic, ILUPP is not compact. Indeed, consider the set of formulas T =
{¬U=0α} ∪ {U< 1nα | n is a positive integer }. Obviously, every finite subset
of T is ILUPPMeas-satisfiable, but the set T is not. Consequently, any finitary
axiomatic system would be incomplete [32]. In order to achieve completeness,
we use two infinitary rules of inference, with countably many premises and
one conclusion.
In order to axiomatize upper and lower probabilities, we need to completely
characterize them with a small number of properties. There are many complete
characterizations in the literature, and the earliest appears to be by Lorentz
[19]. We will use Theorem 1 from the previous section.
For the logic ILUPP, we use the axiomatic system for the logic LUPP from
[26]. We only need to modify the form of the axioms due to presence of mul-
tiple agents. Apart from that, it should be also mentioned that the instances
of axioms are different, since in [26] the operators of upper and lower prob-
ability are applied to classical formulas only, while here their nesting is allowed.
Axiom schemes
(A1) all instances of the classical propositional tautologies
(A2) Ua≤1α ∧ La≤1α
(A3) Ua≤rα→ Ua<sα, s > r
(A4) Ua<sα→ Ua≤sα
(A5) (Ua≤r1α1 ∧ · · · ∧ U
a
≤rmαm) → U
a
≤rα, if α →
∨
J⊆{1,...,m},|J|=k+n
∧
j∈J αj
and
∨
J⊆{1,...,m},|J|=k
∧
j∈J αj are instances of the classical propositional
tautologies, where r =
∑m
i=1 ri−k
n , n 6= 0
(A6) ¬(Ua≤r1α1 ∧ · · · ∧ U
a
≤rmαm), if
∨
J⊆{1,...,m},|J|=k
∧
j∈J αj is an instance of
the classical propositional tautology and
∑m
i=1 ri < k
(A7) La=1(α→ β)→ (Ua≥sα→ Ua≥sβ)
Inference Rules
(1) From α and α→ β infer β
(2) From α infer La≥1α
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(3) From the set of premises
{α→ Ua≥s− 1k β | k ∈ N, k ≥
1
s
}
infer α→ Ua≥sβ
(4) From the set of premises
{α→ La≥s− 1k β | k ∈ N, k ≥
1
s
}
infer α→ La≥sβ.
The axioms A5 and A6 together capture the third condition from the The-
orem 1. Indeed, as explained in [26], “{{A1, . . . , Am}} covers a set A n times”
can be formally written as A ⊆
⋃
J⊆{1,...,m},|J|=n
⋂
j∈J Aj . Thus, the condition
that α→
∨
J⊆{1,...,m},|J|=k+n
∧
j∈J αj is an instance of a propositional tautol-
ogy ensures that [α] is covered n + k times by a multiset {{[α1], . . . , [αm]}},
while the condition that
∨
J⊆{1,...,m},|J|=k
∧
j∈J αj is a propositional tautology
gives us that W = [>] is covered k times by a multiset {{[α1], . . . , [αm]}}.
The rules (3) and (4) are infinitary rules of inference and intuitively state
that if an upper/lower probability is arbitrary close to a rational number s
then it is at least s.
Now we define some proof theoretical notions.
- ` α (α is a theorem) iff there is an at most denumerable sequence of
formulas α1, α2, . . . , α, such that every αi is an axiom or it is derived from
the preceding formulas by an inference rule;
- T ` α (α is derivable from T) if there is an at most denumerable sequence
of formulas α1, α2, . . . , α, such that every αi is an axiom or a formula from
the set T , or it is derived from the preceding formulas by an inference
rule, with the exception that Inference Rule 2 can be applied only to the
theorems;
- T is consistent if there is at least one formula α ∈ ForILUPP that is not
deducible from T , otherwise T is inconsistent;
- T is maximal consistent set if it is consistent and for every α ∈ ForILUPP,
either α ∈ T or ¬α ∈ T ;
- T is deductively closed if for every α ∈ ForILUPP, if T ` α, then α ∈ T .
Note that T is inconsistent iff T ` ⊥. Also, it is easy to check that every
maximal consistent set is deductively closed.
Due to similarity between this axiomatic system and the axiomatization
from [26], many parts of the proof of completeness theorem are similar to the
proofs that we already presented in [26], but there are also several differences,
since the sets of formulas are not the same and the models are different. In
the rest of this section, we present novel proofs and also reuse some ideas from
[26] for readability, while we omit some parts that are identical to the proofs
from [26].
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Theorem 5 (Deduction Theorem) Let α, β ∈ ForILUPP and T a set of
formulae. Then T, α ` β implies T ` α→ β.
Proof. By transfinite induction on the length of the proof of β. The cases when
` β, β = α or β is obtained by modus ponens are standard. So, let β = La≥1γ
be obtained from T ∪ {α} by an application of Rule (2). Since the application
of the inference Rule (2) is restricted to theorems only, we have:
(1) ` γ
(2) T ` γ
(3) T ` La≥1γ by Rule (2)
(4) T ` La≥1γ → (α→ La≥1γ) propositional reasoning
(5) T ` α→ La≥1γ by Rule (1).
Now, let us consider the case where β = β1 → La≥sγ is obtained from
T ∪ {α} by an application of Rule (4). Then:
(1) T, α ` β1 → La≥s− 1k γ, for all k ≥
1
s
(2) T ` α→ (β1 → La≥s− 1k γ), by the induction hypothesis
(3) T ` (α ∧ β1)→ La≥s− 1k γ, propositional reasoning
(4) T ` (α ∧ β1)→ La≥sγ, by Rule (4)
(5) T ` α→ β, propositional reasoning.
Finally, the case where β = β1 → Ua≥sγ is obtained from T ∪ {α} by an
application of Rule (3) is analogous. 
It is easy to check that the axiomatic system AxILUPP is sound with respect
to the class of ILUPPMeas-models.
We prove that the axiomatization AxILUPP is complete, using a Henkin-like
construction. Due to the presence of infinitary rules, the standard completion
technique (Lindenbaum’s theorem) has to be modified in the following way: if
the current theory is inconsistent with the current formula and that formula
can be derived by one of infinitary inference rules, than one of the premises
must be blocked (see the proof of Theorem 6).
Definition 1 (Canonical Model) Canonical model MCan = 〈W,LUP, υ〉
where:
– W = {w | w is a maximal consistent set of formulas},
– for every world w and every propositional letter p, υ(w)(p) = true iff p ∈ w,
– for every a ∈ Σ and w ∈ W , LUP (a,w) = 〈W (a,w), H(a,w), P (a,w)〉 is
defined in the following way:
– W (a,w) = W ,
– H(a,w) = {{u | u ∈W (a,w), α ∈ u} | α ∈ ForILUPP},
– P (a,w) is any set of probability measures such that
P ?(a,w)({u | u ∈W (a,w), α ∈ u}) = sup{s | U≥sα ∈ w}.
Lemma 2 For every a ∈ Σ, every w ∈W and every formula α,
{u | u ∈W (a,w), α ∈ u} = [α]aw.
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Proof. We prove the statement by proving that α ∈ u iff u |= α by induction
on the length of α. If α = p the claim follows by definition of the canonical
model. Cases when α = ¬β or α = β ∧ γ are trivial. Let us consider the case
when α = Ua≥sβ. If α ∈ u then
sup{r | Ua≥rβ ∈ u} = P ?(a, u)({v | v ∈W (a, u), β ∈ v}) ≥ s,
and so u |= α. Now, suppose that u |= Ua≥sβ, i.e.
sup{r | Ua≥rβ ∈ u} ≥ s.
a) If sup{r | Ua≥rβ ∈ u} > s, then by the properties of supremum and mono-
tonicity of P ?(a, u) we obtain U≥sα ∈ u.
b) If sup{r | Ua≥rβ ∈ u} = s, then, as a direct consequence of inference Rule
3, we have that Ua≥sα ∈ u.
The case when α = La≥sβ can be proved using equation (1). 
Lemma 3 MCan is a well defined measurable structure.
Proof. From the Lemma 2 and the fact that P ?(a,w) is an upper probability
measure (the proof that P ?(a,w) is an upper probability measure follows from
Theorem 1 and the axioms A5 and A6 and it is essentially the same as the
proof of the Lemma 3 in [26]) we obtain that MCan is a well defined measurable
structure. 
Theorem 6 (Lindenbaum’s theorem) Every consistent set of formulas can
be extended to a maximal consistent set.
We assume an enumeration α0, α1, . . . of all formulas and define the chain of
sets Ti, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . and the set T
? in the following way:
(1) T0 = T ,
(2) for every i ≥ 0,
(a) if Ti ∪ {αi} is consistent, then Ti+1 = Ti ∪ {αi}, otherwise
(b) if αi is of the form β → Ua≥sα, then Ti+1 = Ti ∪ {¬αi, β → ¬Ua≥s− 1nα},
for some positive integer n, so that Ti+1 is consistent, otherwise
(c) if αi is of the form β → La≥sα, then Ti+1 = Ti ∪ {¬αi, β → ¬La≥s− 1nα},
for some positive integer n, so that Ti+1 is consistent, otherwise
(d) Ti+1 = Ti ∪ {¬αi}.
(3) T ? =
⋃∞
i=0 Ti.
The proof that T ? is a maximal consistent set is based on the following obser-
vations:
i) Natural numbers (n), from the steps 2(b) and 2(c) of the construction exist;
this follows from the Theorem 5.
ii) Each Ti is consistent, by construction.
iii) T ? does not contain all the formulas, by construction, using the fact that
all Ti’s are consistent.
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iv) For every formula α, either α ∈ T ? or ¬α ∈ T ?, by construction (steps (1)
and (2)).
v) For every formula α, if T ? ` α, then α ∈ T ?. The proof of this fact is by
the induction on the length of the inference. Suppose that the sequence
γ1, γ2, . . . , α is the proof of α from T
?. We show only the case when the
sequence is countably infinite. The idea is to prove that, for every i, if γi
is obtained by an application of an arbitrary inference rule, and all the
premises belong to T ?, then, also γi ∈ T ?. Let us consider the infinitary
Rule 4. Let γi = β → La≥sα be obtained from the set of premises {γki = β →
La≥skα | sk = s −
1
k , k >
1
s , k ∈ N}. By the induction hypothesis, we have
that γki ∈ T ?, for every k. If γi /∈ T ?, by step (3)(b) of the construction,
there are some l and j so that
¬(β → La≥sα), β → ¬La≥s− 1l α ∈ Tj .
Thus, we have that for some j′ ≥ j:
- β ∧ ¬La≥sα ∈ Tj′ ,
- β ∈ Tj′ ,
- ¬La≥s− 1l α, L
a
≥s− 1l
α ∈ Tj′ .
Contradiction with the consistency of a set Tj′ . Similarly can be proved for
the Inference Rule (3) and all the other cases are easier.
vi) Step iv) guarantees that T ? is maximal and from v) and iii) we get that
T ? is a deductively closed set that does not contain all the formulas, hence
consistent. 
Theorem 7 (Strong completeness) If α is a formula, and T is a set of
formulas of the logic ILUPP, then T ` α iff T |= α.
Sketch of the proof. First we point out that the theorem follows from sound-
ness of the axiomatic system AxILUPP, and the following usual formulation of
strong completeness:
Every consistent set of formulas T is satisfiable.
Recall that we extended T to the maximal consistent set T ?. We showed that
for every formula α, and every w ∈ W , w |= α iff α ∈ w. Since T ? ∈ W , we
obtain MCan, T
? |= T . 
5 The first-order logic ILUPFO
In this section we briefly discuss the first-order case avoiding repetition of
technical details mentioned for the propositional case.
The language of the logic ILUPFO consists of a denumerable set of variables
V ar = {x, y, z, . . . }, classical propositional connectives, universal quantifier ∀,
for every integer k ≥ 0, denumerably many function symbols F k0 , F k1 , . . . of
arity k, denumerably many relation symbols P k0 , P
k
1 , . . . of arity k, the list of
upper probability operators Ua≥s and the list of lower probability operators
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La≥s. Functions of arity 0 will be called constants. Terms are defined as usual,
as well as the notion of term that is free for a variable.
The set of formulas is the smallest set containing atomic formulas and
that is closed under following formation rules: if α, β are formulas, then La≥sα,
Ua≥sα, ¬α, α ∧ β, (∀x)α are formulas as well.
An ILUPFO-structure is a tuple M = 〈W,D, I, LUP 〉, where:
– W and LUP are defined as in the propositional case,
– D associates a non-empty domain D(w) with every world w ∈W ,
– I associates an interpretation I(w) with every world w ∈W such that:
- I(w)(F ki ) : D(w)
k → D(w), for all i and k,
- I(w)(P ki ) ⊆ D(w)k, for all i and k.
Let M = 〈W,D, I, LUP 〉 be an ILUPFO-structure. A variable valuation υ
assigns to every variable some element of the corresponding domain to every
world w ∈ W , i.e. υ(w)(x) ∈ D(w). For υ, w ∈ W and d ∈ D(w) we define
υw[d/x] is a valuation same as υ except that υw[d/x](w)(x) = d. The value of
a term t, denoted by I(w)(t)υ is defined as follows:
– if t is a variable x, then I(w)(x)υ = υ(w)(x), and
– if t = Fmi (t1, . . . , tm), then
I(w)(t)υ = I(w)(F
m
i )(I(w)(t1)υ, . . . , I(w)(tm)υ).
We consider a class of ILUPFO models that satisfy:
– all the worlds from a model have the same domain, i.e., for all v, w ∈ W ,
D(v) = D(w),
– the terms are rigid, i.e., for every model their meanings are the same in all
the worlds.
The truth value of a formula α in a world w ∈ W of a model M =
〈W,D, I, LUP 〉 for a given valuation υ, denoted by I(w)(α)υ is defined as
follows:
– if α = Pmi (t1, . . . , tm), then I(w)(α)υ = true if 〈I(w)(t1)υ, . . . , I(w)(tm)υ〉 ∈
I(w)(Pmi ), otherwise I(w)(α)υ = false,
– if α = ¬β, then I(w)(α)υ = true if I(w)(β)υ = false, otherwise I(w)(α)υ =
false,
– if α = β∧γ, then I(w)(α)υ = true if I(w)(β)υ = true and I(w)(γ)υ = true,
– if α = Ua≥sβ, then I(w)(α)υ = true if P
?(w, a)({u ∈W (w, a) | I(u)(β)υ =
true}) ≥ s, otherwise I(w)(α)υ = false,
– if α = La≥sβ, then I(w)(α)υ = true if P?(w, a)({u ∈ W (w, a) | I(u)(β)υ =
true}) ≥ s, otherwise I(w)(α)υ = false,
– if α = (∀x)β, then I(w)(α)υ = true if for every d ∈ D(w), I(w)(β)υw[d/x] =
true, otherwise I(w)(α)υ = false.
A formula α holds in a world w from a modelM = 〈W,D, I, LUP 〉, denoted
by M, w |= α, if for every valuation υ, I(w)(α)υ = true. If d ∈ D(w), we use
M, w |= α(d) to denote that I(w)(α(x))υw[d/x] = true, for every valuation υ.
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A sentence α is satisfiable if there is a world w in an ILUPFO-model M
such that M, w |= α. A sentence α is valid if it is satisfied in every world in
every ILUPFO-model M. A set of sentences T is satisfiable if there is a world
w in an ILUPFO-model M such that M, w |= α for every α ∈ T .
We will use the notation ILUPFOMeas to denote the class of all fixed domain
measurable models with rigid terms, where by measurable model we mean
that the set {u ∈W (w, a) | I(u)(α)υ = true} of all worlds from W (w, a) that
satisfy α is measurable.
Axiomatic system for the logic ILUPFO contains all the axioms and infer-
ence rules from the section 4 plus the following axiom schemes:
(A8) (∀x)(α→ β)→ (α→ (∀x)β), where the variable x doesn’t occur free in α
(A9) (∀x)α(x) → α(t), where α(t) is obtained by substitution of all free occur-
rences of x in α(x) by the term t which is free for x in α(x)
and the inference rule:
(5) From α infer (∀x)α.
In the completeness proof we can follow the ideas from the propositional
case. Deduction theorem holds for AxILUPFO. Namely, the facts that our infini-
tary inference rules have implicative form, and that the application of Rule
3 is restricted to theorems only guarantee the proof. Also, we need a special
kind of maximal consistent sets called saturated sets. T is saturated if it is
maximally consistent and satisfies the following condition:
if ¬(∀x)α(x) ∈ T , then for some term t, ¬α(t) ∈ T .
Definition 7 (Canonical model) A canonical modelMCan = 〈W,D, I, LUP 〉
is a tuple such that:
– W is the set of all saturated sets of formulas,
– D is the set of all variable-free terms,
– for every w ∈W , I(w) is an interpretation such that:
– for every function symbol Fmi , I(w)(F
m
i ) : D
m → D such that for all
variable-free terms t1, . . . , tm, I(w)(F
m
i ) : 〈t1, . . . , tm〉 7→ Fmi (t1, . . . , tm),
– for every relation symbol Pmi , I(w)(P
m
i ) = {〈t1, . . . , tm〉 | Pmi (t1, . . . , tm) ∈
w}, for all variable-free terms t1, . . . , tm,
– for a ∈ Σ and w ∈ W , LUP (w, a) = 〈W (w, a), H(w, a), P (w, a)〉 is de-
fined:
- W (w, a) = W ,
- H(w, a) = {{u | u ∈W (w, a), α ∈ u} | α ∈ ForILUPFO},
- P (w, a) is any set of probability measures such that P ?(w, a)({u | u ∈
W (w, a), α ∈ u}) = sup{s | Ua≥sα ∈ w}.
Analogously as in the propositional case it can be proved that the canonical
model is indeed a model via: For every formula α and every w ∈W , α ∈ w iff
w |= α.
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Theorem 8 (Lindenbaum’s theorem) Every consistent set of formulas can
be extended to a saturated set.
Sketch of the proof. Consider a consistent set T and let α0, α1, . . . be an enu-
meration of all formulas from ForILUPFO. Let T
? denote the set of sentences
obtained by the steps (1)-(3) of the Theorem 6 with one additional requirement
in the step (2):
if the set Ti+1 is obtained by adding a formula of the form ¬(∀x)β(x) to the
set Ti, then for some c ∈ C (C is a countably infinite set of new constant
symbols), ¬β(c) is also added to Ti+1, so that Ti+1 is consistent.
The new requirement produces consistent sets as well: suppose that for some
i > 0 the formula αi is of the form (∀x)β(x) and that Ti ∪ {(∀x)β(x)} is not
consistent. Since Ti is consistent, same holds for Ti ∪ {¬(∀x)β(x)}. If there is
a constant c ∈ C such that ¬β(c) ∈ Ti, then obviously Ti ∪ {(∀x)β(x),¬β(c)}
is consistent. Suppose that there is no such c. Since the set T does not contain
constants from C, and Ti ∪ {¬(∀x)β(x)} is obtained by adding only finitely
many formulas to the set T , there must be at least one constant c ∈ C such
that c does not appear in Ti ∪ {¬(∀x)β(x)}. If Ti ∪ {¬(∀x)β(x),¬β(c)} is
not consistent, then Ti,¬(∀x)β(x) ` β(c), and since c does not appear in
Ti ∪ {¬(∀x)β(x)}, we obtain Ti,¬(∀x)β(x) ` (∀x)β(x). Thus, Ti ` (∀x)β(x).
It follows that the set Ti is not consistent, a contradiction.
At the end, we have to show that T ? ` α implies α ∈ T ?, to prove that T ?
is consistent, while the construction guarantees that T ? is both maximal and
saturated. The only case that does not appear in the proof of the Theorem
6 concerns the situation when T ? ` (∀x)β(x) is obtained from T ? ` β(x) by
the inference Rule 5. Since β(x) has one free variable, and Ti and T
? are sets
of sentences, β(x) does not belong to T ?. However, by classical reasoning, we
have T ? ` β(c), for every constant c ∈ C, and from the induction hypothesis
β(c) ∈ T ?. If (∀x)β(x) /∈ T ?, the construction of the set T ? guarantees that
there has to be some i > 0 such that β(c),¬β(c) ∈ Ti for some c ∈ C.
Contradiction. 
Theorem 9 (Strong completeness) Every consistent set of formulas T is
ILUPFOMeas-satisfiable.
6 Adding infinite number of agents
In this section we extend the logics ILUPP and ILUPFO by considering a count-
able set of agents Σ. As previously pointed out by Halpern and Shore in [12],
in many applications where the set of agents is not known in advance, and its
cardinality has no a priori upper bound, it is easiest to model the set of agents
as an infinite set.
In the rest of the section, we focus on extending ILUPP; nevertheless, com-
bining this section with the first-order extension results from the previous
section will straightforwardly lead to the extension of ILUPFO.
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In order to keep the language countable, we will consider a countable set G
of subsets of Σ. We do not pose any constraint about the elements of G (like
closeness under intersection etc.). We use the same operators LG≥s and U
G
≥s as
before, now allowing that G is any member of G. Their semantical definition
remains unchanged. However, the formulas of the form LG≥sα and U
G
≥sα now
cannot be introduced as abbreviation, since we don’t have infinite disjunctions
and conjunctions in syntax. Therefore, we formally:
(a) extend the language with the operators LG≥s and U
G
≥s, where G ∈ G,
(b) extend the definition of satisfiability in order to capture the new operators:
– M,w |= LG≥sα iff M,w |= La≥sα for all a ∈ G,
– M,w |= UG≥sα iff M,w |= Ua≥sα for some a ∈ G.
The extension of the logic ILUPP poses new axiomatization challenges. The
fact that there is an infinite group of agents G ∈ G is an additional source of
non-compactness of the logic. Indeed, the sets {La≥sβ | a ∈ G} ∪ {LG<sβ} and
{Ua<sβ | a ∈ G} ∪ {UG≥sβ} are finitely satisfiable, but unsatisfiable sets of
formulas. For that reason, we will use additional inference rules, in order to
ensure inconsistency of those sets and to obtain strong completeness.
Note that, once we allow infinite groups of agents, we cannot use the for-
mulas LG≥sα ↔
∧
a∈G L
a
≥sα and U
G
≥sα ↔
∨
a∈G U
a
≥sα, as we did in Section 2,
to capture semantical definitions above. Instead, we extend the axiomatization
of ILUPP with the axioms
(A10) LG≥sβ → La≥sβ, if a ∈ G,
(A11) Ua≥sβ → UG≥sβ, if a ∈ G,
and the inference rules
(6) From the set of premises
{α→ La≥sβ | a ∈ G}
infer α→ LG≥sβ
(7) From the set of premises
{α→ Ua<sβ | a ∈ G}
infer α→ UG<sβ.
We will prove that this axiomatization is strongly complete. In the com-
pleteness proof we can follow the ideas from Section 4. However, we need to
extend the proofs of Theorem 5, Lemma 2 and Theorem 6.
In Theorem 5, we prove that T, α ` β implies T ` α → β, using the
induction on the length of inference. Now we have two new inference rules.
Here we consider the rule (6), while the proof for (7) is similar.
Assume that T, α ` β is obtained by the inference rule (6). Then β is
of the form α1 → LG≥sβ1, and we have T, α ` α1 → La≥sβ1 for all a ∈ G.
Consequently, T ` (α∧α1)→ La≥sβ1 for all a ∈ G, by the induction hypothesis
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and simple propositional reasoning (i.e., (p → (q → r)) ←→ ((p ∧ q) → r)).
By the rule (6) we obtain T ` (α ∧ α1) → LG≥sβ1, or, equivalently, T ` α →
(α1 → LG≥sβ1). Thus, T ` α→ β.
Next, in the proof of Lemma 2 we need to extend the proof that α ∈ u
iff u |= α. The proof was by induction on the complexity of α. Since we now
have a larger set of formulas, we need to consider the two additional cases
in the proof: when α is of the form LG≥sβ and when it is U
G
≥sβ. We assume
that the operators of the group are of higher complexity then the operators of
individual agents, for example LG≥sβ is more complex then U
a
≥sβ. It is sufficient
to show that for every maximal consistent set T ? the following conditions hold:
(1) LG≥sβ ∈ T ? iff {La≥sβ | a ∈ G} ⊆ T ?,
(2) UG≥sβ ∈ T ? iff Ua≥sβ ∈ T ? for some a ∈ G.
Note that (1) follows directly from (A10) and the inference rule (6), and that
(⇐) part of (2) follows from (A11). Let us prove (⇒) part of (2). Suppose that
UG≥sβ ∈ T ? and Ua≥sβ /∈ T ? for every a ∈ G. By Maximality of T ?, we have
{Ua<sβ | a ∈ G} ⊆ T ?. Then T ? ` UG<sβ by the rule (7); a contradiction.
Finally, we need to modify the completion technique in the proof of Theo-
rem 6. Recall that the completion of T is defined through an iterative process,
assuming an enumeration α0, α1, . . . of all formulas. In the presence of the new
rules, two new cases should be considered in the step (2), when Ti ∪ {αi} is
inconsistent:
(e) if αi is of the form α → LG≥sβ, then Ti+1 = Ti ∪ {¬αi, α → La<sβ}, for
some agent a ∈ G such that Ti+1 is consistent,
(f) if αi is of the form α → UG<sβ, then Ti+1 = Ti ∪ {¬αi, α → Ua≥sβ}, for
some agent a ∈ G such that Ti+1 is consistent.
First, we need to show that each of the two conditions is correctly formu-
lated, i.e., that there exists an agent a ∈ G such that Ti+1 is consistent.
This follows from Deduction theorem. For example, let us consider (e): if
Ti+1 = Ti ∪ {¬αi, α→ La<sβ} is inconsistent for all a ∈ G, then Ti ∪ {¬αi} `
¬(α → La<sβ) for all a ∈ G. By (A1) we obtain Ti ∪ {¬αi} ` α → La≥sβ for
all a ∈ G, therefore Ti ∪ {¬αi} ` α→ LG≥sβ by the inference rule (6).
Second, we need to prove that after adding the new inference rules, T ?
is still deductively closed, i.e. T ? ` α implies α ∈ T ? (condition v) of the
proof). Let us prove that T ? is closed under the rule (6). Let {α → La≥sβ |
a ∈ G} ∈ T ?. Let α → LG≥sβ = αi, and suppose that α → LG≥sβ /∈ T ?.
Then from the condition (e) we obtain ¬(α → LG≥sβ) ∈ Ti+1; consequently,
Ti+1 ` α. The same condition also ensures α → La<sβ ∈ Ti+1, for some agent
a ∈ G. Recall that α → La≥sβ = αj ∈ T ?. Let j be the positive integer such
that α → La≥sβ = αj . Then Tmax{i+1,j} ` α, Tmax{i+1,j} ` α → La≥sβ and
Tmax{i+1,j} ` α → La<sβ, so Tmax{i+1,j} ` ⊥; a contradiction. The proof that
T ? is closed under the rule (7) is similar.
At the end of this section, we discuss the decidability issue. We can prove
that this logic is decidable, provided that we can check whether the sets that
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are obtained by finite set operations on elements of G are empty or not. The
similar assumption is posed by Halpern and Shore in [12], where it is also
observed that possibility of deciding the cardinality of the set G\(G1∪· · ·∪Gn)
in general depends on the way how G,G1, . . . , Gn are presented and that if
G,G1, . . . , Gn are recursive sets, deciding if G\(G1∪· · ·∪Gn) is empty may not
even be recursive. If we assume that we have oracles for testing whether those
sets are empty or not, we can, given a formula α, detect all the nonempty
sets obtained by applying set operations on groups mentioned in α.3 Then
we can replace all the agents that have same membership functions in those
sets (i.e., that belong to exactly the same groups) by a single representative
of the set. In that way, we modify α by replacing each infinite set of agents
from α with a finite set. Then we can use finite conjunctions and disjunction
to eliminate sets of agents, using the tautologies LG≥sβ ↔
∧
a∈G L
a
≥sβ and
UG≥sβ ↔
∨
a∈G U
a
≥sβ. In that way we obtain a formula of the logic ILUPP and
we can apply the procedure from Section 3 to check its satisfiability.
7 ILUPP and ILUPFO as generalizations of probabilistic logics
In this section we prove that the logics ILUPP and ILUPFO in a sense contain
the logics LPP1 and LFOP1 (respectively) for reasoning about sharp probabil-
ities [23,24]. The two logics presented here have the similar semantical struc-
ture as the logics LPP1 and LFOP1, since they both use Kripke-like structures.
It is intuitively clear that the semantics of our logics are more general, since
reasoning about upper and lower probabilities requires sets of probability mea-
sures, while in the logics for reasoning about sharp probabilities one measure
per possible world is sufficient (and thus they are isomorphic to the “sets of”
probability measures which are actually singletons). On the other hand, the
axiomatic systems are quite different. Here we will focus on the two proof the-
oretical aspects of the generalization: first, which axioms should be added to
our logics (both ILUPP and ILUPFO) to reduce the proposed class of models
to the class of models isomorphic to the one for corresponding logic for sharp
probabilities (LPP1 and LFOP1, respectively), and second, how we can use the
added axioms to formally obtain the axiomatizations of LPP1 and LFOP1.
In the rest of the section we will focus on relation between the logics ILUPP
and LPP1, but we stress that, similarly as in the previous section, analogous
reasoning leads to the same relation in the first-order case, namely between
the logics ILUPFO and LFOP1. First we state only those properties of the logic
LPP1 important for this section (for more details about the logic LPP1, as well
as for the logic LFOP1 we refer the reader to [23,24]).
The language of the logic LPP1 extends the classical propositional language
with the list of operators P≥s, where s is a rational number from the [0, 1].
Concerning the syntax, besides the classical propositional formulas, formulas
3 Here, for simplicity, we can assume that all the singletons are in G, in order to capture
the operators indexed by individual agents.
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of the form P≥sα are also included. For example, p ∧ P≤ 12 q and P= 13P≥1p are
well defined formulas. LPP1-structures are defined as triples M = 〈W,Prob, ν〉,
where:
– W is a non empty set of worlds
– Prob is a probability assignment which assigns to every w ∈ W a proba-
bility space, such that Prob(w) = 〈W (w), H(w), µ(w)〉, where:
W (w) is a non empty subset of W ,
H(w) is an algebra of subsets of W (w) and
µ(w) : H(w)→ [0, 1] is a finitely additive probability measure.
– ν provides for each world w an evaluation of the primitive propositions.
Satisfiability of a formula is defined as expected for the classical proposi-
tional formulas and
M,w |= P≥sα iff µ({v ∈W (w) | v |= α}) ≥ s.
Axiomatization of the logic LPP1 is the following:
(P1) all substitutional instances of the classical propositional tautologies,
(P2) P≥0α,
(P3) P≤rα→ P<sα, s > r,
(P4) P<sα→ P≤sα,
(P5) (P≥tα ∧ P≥sβ ∧ P≥1(¬α ∨ ¬β))→ P≥min{1,t+s}(α ∨ β),
(P6) (P≤tα ∧ P<sβ)→ P<t+s(α ∨ β), t+ s ≤ 1.
Inference Rules
(1) Modus Ponens,
(2) from α infer P≥1α,
(3) from the set of premises
{A→ P≥s− 1kα | k ≥
1
s
}
infer A→ P≥sα.
Soundness and strong completeness theorems for the logic LPP1 are proved
(for more details see [24], chapter 4).
We will now focus on the relationship between ILUPP and LPP1. First,
since the logic LPP1 is not a multi-agent logic we put that the set of agents Σ
is a singleton set (so instead of Ua≥rα we will write U≥rα).
Then, it is clear that the subclass of the ILUPP-structures that contains
those structures where the set of finitely additive probability measures is a
singleton set is isomorphic to the class of LPP1-structures. Therefore, we add
the following axiom:
(A12) U≥rα→ L≥rα. (3)
We will denote ILUPP+Axiom A12 by ILUPPExt.
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Let us recall note that it is shown in [26] (Proposition 1) that the following
formula is a theorem in our axiomatization:
` U≤rα→ L≤rα. (4)
From (3) and (4) follows that U and L have the same behavior in the sense
that for every formula α and every r ∈ S
` U≥rα↔ L≥rα. (5)
This means that in ILUPPExt one type of operators is sufficient, since changing
one type of operator with other will lead to an equivalent formula. For example,
if we replace all the operators for lower probability with the operators of upper
probability in
α ≡ L≥ 13U≤ 12L=1p,
we will obtain the formula
β ≡ U≥ 13U≤ 12U=1p
which is equivalent to α. This holds for any formula and can be proved in a
straightforward manner by the induction on the complexity of a formula. This
fact allows us, without loss of generality, to consider only formulas with the U
operators in ILUPPExt.
Our goal is to prove that the set of theorems of the logic LPP1 is a subset
of the set of theorems of the logic ILUPPExt. Therefore, we will prove that all
the axioms and inference rules of the logic LPP1 can be inferred in the logic
ILUPPExt, where P is replaced by U .
Also notice that from the semantical point of view, addition of the axiom
A12 guarantees that in an ILUPP-structure the set of finitely additive prob-
ability measures is a singleton set and therefore has the same form as the
LPP1-structure.
The axioms (P1)-(P4) correspond to the axioms (A1)-(A4). It is also clear
that the inference rules coincide as well. Our goal is to prove that the appro-
priate counterparts of the axioms (P5) and (P6), i.e.,
(U5) (U≥tγ ∧ U≥sβ ∧ U≥1(¬γ ∨ ¬β))→ U≥min{1,t+s}(γ ∨ β),
(U6) (U≤tγ ∧ U<sβ)→ U<t+s(γ ∨ β), t+ s ≤ 1,
follow from the axiomatization of ILUPPExt, while in the inference the
essential role play the axioms:
(A5) (Ua≤r1α1∧· · ·∧U
a
≤rmαm)→ U
a
≤rα, if α→
∨
J⊆{1,...,m},|J|=k+n
∧
j∈J αj and∨
J⊆{1,...,m},|J|=k
∧
j∈J αj are tautologies, where r =
∑m
i=1 ri−k
n , n 6= 0
(A6) ¬(Ua≤r1α1 ∧ · · · ∧U
a
≤rmαm), if
∨
J⊆{1,...,m},|J|=k
∧
j∈J αj is a tautology and∑m
i=1 ri < k.
In order to prove that we need the following Lemma:
Lemma 4 ILUPPExt ` (U≤tγ ∧ U≤sβ)→ U≤t+s(γ ∨ β), t+ s ≤ 1.
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Proof. We will show that for t+ s ≤ 1
(U≤tγ ∧ U≤sβ)→ U≤t+s(γ ∨ β) (6)
can be infered from A5. Consider the axiom A5 for:
m = 2; n = 1, k = 0; r1 = t; r2 = s;
α1 = γ; α2 = β; α = γ ∨ β.
In this case we obtain r = t + s and therefore the Axiom A5 has exactly
the shape of the formula (6). We need also to check whether the formulas
α→
∨
J⊆{1,2},|J|=1
∧
j∈J
αj
and ∨
J⊆{1,2},|J|=0
∧
j∈J
αj
are tautologies. The first formula has the form γ ∨ β → γ ∨ β which is clearly
a tautology, while the second formula has the form
∧
j∈∅ αj , and
∧
j∈∅ αj = >
by definition and hence a tautology. 
Theorem 10 The set of theorems of the logic LPP1 is a subset of the set of
theorems of the logic ILUPPExt.
Proof. As already stated, we need only to prove that:
(a) ILUPPExt ` (U≥tγ ∧ U≥sβ ∧ U≥1(¬γ ∨ ¬β))→ U≥min{1,t+s}(γ ∨ β),
(b) ILUPPExt ` (U≤tγ ∧ U<sβ)→ U<t+s(γ ∨ β), t+ s ≤ 1.
Proof of (a). Recall that the formula
(U≥tγ ∧ U≥sβ ∧ U≥1(¬γ ∨ ¬β))→ U≥min{1,t+s}(γ ∨ β)
can be written as:
(U≤1−t¬γ ∧ U≤1−s¬β ∧ U≤0(γ ∧ β))→ U≤1−min{1,t+s}¬(γ ∨ β).
Now, consider the axiom A5 for:
m = 3; n = k = 1; r1 = 1− t; r2 = 1− s; r3 = 0;
α1 = ¬γ; α2 = ¬β; α3 = γ ∧ β; α = ¬(γ ∨ β).
We obtain that r = 1− (t+ s).
(i) If t+ s > 1 then (Axiom A6,
∑m
i=1 ri < k)
` ¬(U≤1−t¬γ ∧ U≤1−s¬β ∧ U≤0(γ ∧ β))
and hence
` (U≤1−t¬γ ∧ U≤1−s¬β ∧ U≤0(γ ∧ β))→ U≤1−min{1,t+s}¬(γ ∨ β)).
28 D. Doder, N. Savić, Z. Ognjanović
(ii) If t+ s ≤ 1, then 1−min{1, t+ s} = 1− (t+ s) = r and it is left to check
if
α→
∨
J⊆{1,2,3},|J|=2
∧
j∈J
αj
and ∨
J⊆{1,2,3},|J|=1
∧
j∈J
αj
are tautologies. Namely, in this case, the first formula has the following
form: ¬(γ ∨β)→ ((¬γ ∧¬β)∨ (¬γ ∧ γ ∧β)∨ (¬β ∧ γ ∧β)), and the second
formula: ¬γ ∨ ¬β ∨ (γ ∧ β). It is obvious that both of these formulas are
tautologies and therefore is this part proved.
Proof of (b).
Let us show equivalently that ILUPPExt ` (U≤tγ ∧ U≥t+s(γ ∨ β))→ U≥sβ:
` U≥t+s(γ ∨ β)→ U>t+s′(γ ∨ β), for all s′ < s (contraposition of A3)
U≤tγ ∧ U≥t+s(γ ∨ β) ` U≤tγ ∧ U>t+s′(γ ∨ β), for all s′ < s
U≤tγ ∧ U≥t+s(γ ∨ β) ` U≤tγ ∧ U>s′β, for all s′ < s (by Lemma 4)
U≤tγ ∧ U≥t+s(γ ∨ β) ` U≥sβ (by Inference Rule (3))
` (U≤tγ ∧ U≥t+s(γ ∨ β))→ U≥sβ (by Deduction theorem) 
8 Conclusion
In this paper we present the proof-theoretical analysis of two logics which
allow making statements about upper and lower probabilities. The introduced
formalisms, the propositional logic ILUPP and its first-order extension ILUPFO,
can be used for reasoning not only about lower and upper probabilities an
agent assigns to a certain event, but also about her uncertain belief about
other agent’s imprecise probabilities. The languages of our logics are modal
languages which extend classical propositional/first-order languages with the
unary operators Ua≥r and L
a
≥r, where a is an agent and r ranges over the
unit interval of rational numbers. The corresponding semantics consist of the
measurable Kripke models with sets of finitely additive probability measures
attached to each possible world.
We prove that the proposed axiomatic systems are strongly complete with
respect to the class of measurable models. Since the logics are not compact,
the axiomatizations contain infinitary rules of inference. In [26] it is shown
that the same axiomatic systems (the only difference is that in [26] only one
agent is considered) is sound and complete for the logics without nesting of
probabilistic operators. This situation is not an exception. For example, modal
system K is sound and complete with respect to the class of all modal models,
but also with respect to the class of all irreflexive models [14].
We provided the extensions of the proposed axiomatizations in order to
properly capture the notions of lower and upper probability of an infinite set
of agents. We also showed that the logics ILUPP and ILUPFO generalize the
logics for reasoning about sharp probabilities from [23,24].
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We also prove that the satisfiability problem for ILUPP logic is decidable.
In the proof, we use the method of filtration [14] to show that if a formula
is satisfiable in a world w of an ILUPP structure, then it is satisfiable in a
finite structure. We also use a reduction to linear programming to deal with
infinitely many probability measures definable on finite algebras, and to solve
the satisfiability problem in a finite number of steps.
We propose two topics for future work. First, we would like to investigate
an alternative to the approach of upper and lower probability of a group pre-
sented here. We assumed that the agents share their sets of probabilities in
order to obtain a larger set, available to all the members of the group. Alterna-
tively, we wish to investigate the scenario in which they share their constraints,
i.e., a group accepts those probability measures which satisfy lower and upper
constraints of all the members of the group (i.e., LG≥sα would be defined as a
disjunction, and UG≥sα as a conjunction). Note that this approach leads to an
debatable consequence: consider the group G = {a, b}, where both lower and
upper probability of α are 12 for the agent a, while they are both
1
3 for b; then
lower probability of α wrt. G would be greater then the corresponding upper
probability. This indicates that this approach is sensible if the formulas cap-
ture agents’ imprecise knowledge about an objective probability, in which case
there shouldn’t be inconsistencies between the knowledge of different agents.
In terms of semantics, the upper and lower probabilities of different agents
should be all satisfied by a probability measure.
Second, we will investigate complexity of satisfiability problem for the logic
ILUPP. Such a method is already developed in [16] for probabilistic logics with
iterations of standard probability operators. Note that the fact that ILUPP
is a generalization of the logic LPP1 already leads to a complexity bound for
ILUPP. Namely, it was shown in [16] that the satisfiability problem for the
logic LPP1 is PSPACE-complete, thus a lower complexity bound for ILUPP is
PSPACE.
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